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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-SALE OF REALTY IN THE 
ESTATE-BETTER PRICE AS REASON FOR PERMITTING SALE UNDER "BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE ESTATE" PROVISION-Pursuant to a Missouri statute 
permitting sale of real property for any purpose in the best interests of 
the estate,1 administrator filed a petition for power to sell realty in the 
estate of the decedent for the reason, inte-r alia, that a better price could be 
obtained at a private sale than at a judicial sale resulting from a suit for 
partition.2 The plaintiff heir's subsequent bill for partition of the real 
estate was dismissed by the trial court, which found that the administrator's 
petition for power to sell had conferred jurisdiction of the property on the 
probate court. On appeal, held, reversed. The statute authorizing sale of 
real estate by an administrator deals with the administration of an estate 
as an entity distinct and apart from the interests of the decedent's heirs or 
1 "Purposes for which property may be sold, mortgaged, leased or exchanged. 1. Real 
or personal property belonging to an estate may be sold, mortgaged, leased or exchanged 
under court order when necessary for any of the following purposes: (I) For the payment 
of claims allowed against the estate; (2) For the payment of any allowance made to the 
surviving spouse and minor children of the decedent; (3) For the payment of any legacy 
given by the will of the decedent; (4) For the payment of expenses of administration, in-
cluding court costs; (5) For the payment of any gift, estate, inheritance or transfer taxes 
assessed upon the transfer of the estate or due from the decedent or his estate; (6) For any 
other purpose in the best interests of the estate." Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.460 (Supp. 1962). 
(Emphasis added.) 
2 The court noted that the appellee relied exclusively upon this reason in the principal 
case. Initially, however, the administrator had supported his petition for power to sell with 
a second reason, that distribution in kind was not feasible. The court said unequivocally, 
though in dictum, that this is not a sufficient basis for permitting sale of realty. Principal 
case at 412. 
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distributees; an administrator's petition for power to sell supported solely 
by a reason which concerns only the heirs does not confer jurisdiction on 
the probate court. McIntosh v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 366 S.W. 2d 
409 (Mo. 1963). 
At common law a decedent's real property was not, in the absence of 
testamentary authority,3 chargeable, as was personal property,4 for his 
debts, the expenses of administration, or commissions.11 In all American 
jurisdictions except Virginia, however, statutory exceptions to this com-
mon-law rule exist which permit the sale of realty in the estate when neces-
sary to satisfy the debts of the decedent.6 Modem legislation has further 
expanded this area of probate jurisdiction by permitting the sale of realty 
when necessary to satisfy claims accruing against the estate in addition to 
debts incurred during the life of the deceased.7 These statutes, however, 
have been strictly construed because they derogate from the common law.8 
This narrow construction is exemplified by the requirement imposed in 
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia that an administrator 
desiring to sell realty to satisfy any of the statutorily authorized claims 
must show the probate court that the personal estate is insufficient for this 
purpose.9 In the remaining states, a court of probate jurisdiction may order 
3 Broadhurst v. Mewborn, 171 N.C. 400, 88 S.E. 628 (1916). See generally Annots., Im-
plied power of executor or testator-trustee to sell real estate, 134 A.L.R. 378 (1941); Annot., 
23 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1952); ATKINSON, WILLS § 123 (2d ed. 1953). 
4 See, e.g., In re Estate of Lausterer, 30 Ill. App. 2d 401, 174 N.E.2d 888 (1961); Tobiason 
v. Machen, 217 Md. 207, 142 A.2d 145 (1948). The common-law theory was that title to 
realty vested in the heirs or devisees immediately upon the death of decedent. See 
Blizzard v. Penley, 186 F. Supp. 746 (D. Colo. 1960); In re Estate of Fry, 28 Misc. 2d 949, 
218 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Surr. Ct. 1961). It is, however, almost universally true in American 
jurisdictions today that while title to realty vests in the beneficiaries, statutes provide for 
possession by the personal representative for purposes of settling the estate. See generally 
JENKS, SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 66 (5th ed. 1938); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROBATE 
AND BANK ATTORNEYS, PROBATE LAW DIGEST (1938). 
II JENKS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 65-66; ZOLLMAN, TIFFANY'S REAL PROPERTY 826-27 
(abridged ed. 1940). 
o ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 123. In Virginia, the only way in which land may 
be reached to satisfy creditors' claims is by action against the heir or devisee unless the 
will provides for payment out of land. Catron v. Bostic, 123 Va. 355, 96 S.E. 845 (1918). 
This is substantially the common-law procedure. 
1 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 702-53 (1948) (sale authorized to meet "all charges against 
the estate'); Folley v. Gribling, 128 Ind. 110, 26 N.E. 794 (1891) (expenses of administra-
tion); see Ellyson v. Lord, 124 Iowa 125, 99 N.W. 582 (1904) (legacies). See generally 
ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 123. However, a number of states still narrowly limit 
the purposes for which realty can be sold. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 157 (1957), 
applied in Tait v. Safe Deposit &: Trust Co., 70 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1934) (realty not liable 
for expenses of administration); McGaw v. Gorten, 96 Md. 489, 54 Atl. 133 (1903) (debt 
must be due during decedent's lifetime). 
s See, e.g., In re Wetter's Estate, 15 Misc. 2d 190, 179 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Surr. Ct. 1958). See 
generally ALLEN, LAw IN THE MAKING 442 (6th ed. 1958); Fox, Sales in Probate Court, 20 
WIS. S.B.A. BULL. 120 (1947). 
9 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Roberton, 139 So. 2d 604 (Ala. 1963); Poindexter v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 247 N.C. 606, 101 S.E.2d 682 (1958); see ZOLLMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 828: "A 
sale of realty to pay debts is ordinarily authorized when the personal estate is insufficient, 
and such facts, to give the court jurisdiction, must appear from the bill or petition." For 
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the sale of realty in lieu of personalty when such a sale is beneficial to 
the estate.10 However, the existence of a claim against the estate is in 
nearly all jurisdictions a sine qua non of the power to sell real assets.11 An 
exception to this generalization exists in those states which provide that 
the probate court may, with the consent of one or more of the interested 
parties, authorize the sale of realty even though no claims remain to be 
satisfied.12 
The Missouri Drafting Committee's comment on the statute applied 
in the principal case asserts that the Model Probate Code formulation was 
intended to be adopted.13 The Model Code comprehensively expands pro-
bate jurisdiction over the sale of estate assets. First, probate jurisdiction is 
enlarged by abolishing the common-law distinction between personal and 
real property,14 thereby making it possible to sell realty in the estate even 
though the personalty is not exhausted. Second, the probate court is 
authorized to permit the sale of estate assets to satisfy all valid claims that 
arise in the course of administration.15 Finally, the Code expands probate 
jurisdiction in situations like that of the principal case by permitting the 
sale of realty for the purpose of distribution when distribution in kind 
would prove unsatisfactory.16 If the Committee Comment were completely 
statutory examples, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 225 (Smith-Hurd 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT, 
ANN. § 59-1410 (Supp. 1961). 
10 See Basye, Abolition of the Distinction Between Real and Personal Property in the 
Administration of the Decedent's Estate, 51 ILL. B.J. 214 (1962). For statutory examples, 
see CAL. PROB. CODE§ 754; MICH. COMP. LAws § 709.2 (1948). 
11 See, e.g., In re Estate of Canfield, 107 Cal. App. 2d 682, 238 P.2d 67 (1951); In re 
DaRoza's Estate, 82 Cal. App. 2d 550, 186 P .2d 725 (1947); Magaw v. Emick, 167 Kan. 580, 
207 P.2d 448 (1949); Oldham v. McElroy, 134 Ky. 454, 121 S.W. 414 (1909). Contra, Offredi 
v. Huhla, 135 Conn. 20, 60 A.2d 779 (1948); Callahan v. Peltier, 121 Conn. 106, 183 Atl. 400 
(1936); Hartman v. Vissage, 191 Ga. 446, 12 S.E. 294 (1940); Warren v. Warren, 104 Ga. 
App. 184, 121 S.E.2d 343 (1961). 
12 ALA. CoDE tit. 61, § 245 (1948) allows sale of realty by the executor or administrator, 
though all claims are satisfied, if an adult heir or devisee files his written consent to sale 
of the land; ALAsKA CoMP. LAws ANN. § 13.30.675 (Supp. 1963) allows sale if the heir or 
heirs direct in a written request which has been acknowledged as in a deed and filed in the 
court having probate of the estate; MICH. COMP. LAws § 709.2 (1948) allows sale if approved 
in writing by the persons owning a majority interest of the real estate proposed to be sold; 
N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-7-11 (1953) allows sale if all interested parties file a written consent. 
13 "COMMITTEE COMMENT: Subsection l is a copy of section 152 of the Model Probate 
Code and constitutes an expansion of the grounds upon which property may be sold or 
dealt with." 26 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 152, at 163. (Emphasis added.) 
14 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 150 (Simes 1946); see Simes, The Organization of the Probate 
Court in America, 43 MICH. L. REv. 113, 125 (1944): "Much can be said for legislation of 
this character. Certainly there is no justification today for a distinction between real and 
personal estates with respect to the title of the personal representative." See Basye, supra 
note 10: The advantages of abolishing the distinction are (a) equal treatment of both 
types of property, (b) improvement of the mechanics of administration, (c) encouragement 
to adopt uniform laws, (d) prevention of title defects, and (e) equalization of the abatement 
question. 
15 MoDEL PROBATE CODE § 152 (Simes 1946). According to this provision, the probate 
court may authorize sale for funeral costs or expenses of administration as readily as for 
debts incurred during the life of the deceased. 
16 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 152(£) (Simes 1946). The comment following this section 
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accurate in asserting that the Missouri legislature adopted the pertinent 
section of the Model Probate Code, it would seem that the Missouri 
Supreme Court gave the statute an inexcusably narrow reading in denying 
probate jurisdiction over the realty. However, it appears that the Comment 
is not correct because the subsection of the Model Code which authorizes 
sale for the purpose of distribution does not appear in the Missouri code.17 
Thus, the court's strong dictum to the effect that a sale for the purpose of 
distribution is not permitted accurately interpreted legislative intent. The 
court likewise properly applied the statute in rejecting the other reason 
advanced in support of the petition-that a better price could be obtained 
at a private sale. The statute does not specifically authorize a sale for that 
purpose; nor does the comprehensive "best interests of the estate" sub-
section permit sale in this instance because, as the court correctly observed, 
the price at which assets in the estate are sold concerns only the heirs if 
there are no claims by creditors. 
In the principal case the administrator did not show that the desired 
sale was sought by any of the heirs. Had he done so, the court might have 
viewed the petition as presenting a somewhat different question. If it is 
clear from the demands of one or more heirs that partition will be neces-
sary, the probate court, already having jurisdiction of the estate, can 
prevent the expense and delay of a suit for partition by granting the 
administrator's request for power to sell. It has already been noted that 
statutes in some states make partition properly a part of administration 
under such circumstances.18 
The Model Probate Code, in authorizing sale for the purpose of 
distribution although there are no claims against the estate and no request 
from any heirs, appears to dictate a result different from that reached in the 
principal case. In comparing the Missouri statute to the Model Code, 
the basic policy consideration should be whether the sale of realty for the 
purpose of distribution or of obtaining a better price at private sale is 
properly a matter for determination by the administrator. This question 
should be resolved in the negative. Since sale by the administrator may 
provide a higher valuation and thereby increase the base for his fee, it 
seems undesirable to grant the administrator the opportunity so to 
aggrandize his compensation. This seems a likely basis for the decision of 
the Missouri legislature to omit this Model Probate Code provision. 
Permitting an administrator's sale of real property in the absence of 
claims against the estate or the consent of the heirs is inconsistent with the 
implies that the Code makes no distinction between a sale to satisfy a valid claim and a 
sale for distribution. This is contrary to the great weight of authority. See note 11 supra 
and accompanying text. 
17 Compare the applicable Missouri statute, supra note 1, with § 152 of the Model 
Probate Code, which includes an additional purpose for which estate assets may be sold: 
"For making distribution of the estate or any part thereof." 
18 See note 12 supra. 
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goal of the Model Probate Code to facilitate distribution of the decedents• 
estates and to dispense with administration in all cases where no protection 
of creditors is necessary.19 These goals are better implemented by the rule 
of the principal case that partition or the possibility of a better sale price 
of the land does not concern the administration of the estate and, there• 
fore, cannot sustain an administrator's petition for power to sell. It is to be 
hoped, however, that this decision will not prevent the authorization of 
an administrator's sale where some of the heirs desire it and where the 
alternative would involve the expenses of a separate suit in partition. 
William ]. Bogaard 
19 Rheinstein, The Model Probate Code: A Critique, 48 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 534, 535, 
549-50 (I 948). 
